Title: A closed-loop supply chain game model considering reciprocal preferences and echelon utilisation

Authors: Shan Yu; Qiang Hou

Addresses: School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, 110870, China ' School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, 110870, China

Abstract: Considering the closed-loop supply chain decision-making process of power battery cascade utilisation under the reciprocal preference, this paper constructs the profit function of all stakeholders in the power battery closed-loop supply chain, studies the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics, simulates the path evolution process of profits by numerical simulation, analyses the sensitivity of parameters, and verifies the impact of various parameters on the overall structure and path. The results show that with the increase of the reciprocity preference degree, the manufacturers will increase the retail price of new power batteries and the repurchase price of used batteries, and the echelon users will not change the retail price of high energy density batteries. The reciprocal preference behaviour among members enhances the interests of other members through profit transfer, achieves the maximum benefits of the closed-loop supply chain and promotes the sustained and stable operation of the supply chain.

Keywords: closed-loop supply chain; cascade utilisation; reciprocal preference; power battery.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSOM.2026.153858

International Journal of Services and Operations Management, 2026 Vol.54 No.1, pp.58 - 80

Received: 22 Feb 2024
Accepted: 02 Mar 2024
Published online: 29 May 2026 *

Full-text access for editors Full-text access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article