Title: Keynesian beauty contest in Morocco's public procurement reform

Authors: Nizar Riane

Addresses: Faculty of Law, Economic and Social Sciences – Agdal, Mohammed V University in Rabat, Avenue des Nations-Unies, B.P. 721 Rabat, Morocco

Abstract: This paper examines the recent reform of Morocco's public procurement market through the lens of Keynesian beauty contest theory. The reform introduces a mechanism akin to a guessing-the-average game, where bidders attempt to estimate a reference price, which in turn impacts bidding strategies. We utilise this setup to empirically test key hypotheses within auction theory, specifically the roles of common knowledge and bounded rationality. Our findings indicate potential manipulation risks under the current rules, suggesting that a shift to a median criterion could improve robustness and reduce the likelihood of manipulation. This work contributes to the broader understanding of strategic interactions in procurement and offers a foundation for future research on improving fairness and efficiency in public contract allocation.

Keywords: auction; Keynesian beauty contest; guessing the average; game theory; limited rationality.

DOI: 10.1504/IJPM.2026.150258

International Journal of Procurement Management, 2026 Vol.25 No.1, pp.119 - 137

Received: 07 Oct 2024
Accepted: 02 Nov 2024
Published online: 05 Dec 2025 *

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