Title: Antecedents of hidden action problems in the Egyptian automobile insurance market: buyer-supplier relationship perspective
Authors: Eslam Thabet; Nazaré Rego; Arnt Buvik
Addresses: Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport (AASTMT), Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal ' NIPE, Escola de Economia e Gestão, Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal ' Molde University College, Specialized University in Logistics, P.O. Box 2110, 6402 Molde, Norway
Abstract: This paper explores the impact of asymmetric information in an exchange relationship involving pre-screening by insurers, trust, and self-protection provided by different kinds of contracts on hidden action problems in the Egyptian automobile insurance market from two major theoretical perspectives: principle-agent theory and relational-contracting theory. Survey data on 63 relationships between insurers and business policyholders were analysed, demonstrating that asymmetric information is one of the main antecedents of hidden action problems by policyholders. The level of trust between insurers and policyholders, and the level of pre-screening of insurers attenuate hidden action problems by policyholders. Moreover, the study reveals that self-protection attenuates hidden actions more effectively if a co-payment automobile insurance contract is at stake than if a deductible contract was signed. Finally, revealing the dark side of buyer-supplier relationships in insurance confirms the necessity for policyholders to disclose the information of whether they engage in self-protecting actions or not.
Keywords: hidden actions; dark side; opportunism; buyer-supplier relationship; BSR; asymmetric information; co-payment contract.
International Journal of Procurement Management, 2024 Vol.20 No.3, pp.302 - 330
Received: 05 Oct 2022
Accepted: 24 Dec 2022
Published online: 05 Jun 2024 *