Title: Director categorisation and monitoring efficiency

Authors: Samira Abi Dames; Bilal Al-Dah; Mustafa Dah

Addresses: Adnan Kassar School of Business, Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon ' College of Business and Public Management, Kean University, New Jersey, USA ' Adnan Kassar School of Business, Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structure and firm monitoring. Though non-co-opted independent directors enhance internal monitoring, co-opted independent directors seem to be the worst monitors. We do not observe a substantial difference in the monitoring functionality of co-opted and non-co-opted inside board members. Our paper suggests that co-opted independent directors are the main driving factor behind the converse association between co-opted boards and internal monitoring. We conclude that the efficiency of board monitoring should not be analysed solely based on director classification or director co-option, but rather a combination of both.

Keywords: director co-option; board structure; monitoring efficiency.

DOI: 10.1504/IJBGE.2023.130097

International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2023 Vol.17 No.3, pp.310 - 329

Received: 23 Apr 2021
Accepted: 26 Nov 2021
Published online: 05 Apr 2023 *

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