Title: Do board characteristics matter for the dividend policy of state-owned companies? Evidence from Russia
Authors: Irina V. Berezinets; Yulia B. Ilina; Marat V. Smirnov; Tengiz G. Ambardnishvili
Addresses: Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University, Volkhovskiy Per., 3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia ' Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University, Volkhovskiy Per., 3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia ' Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University, Volkhovskiy Per., 3, St. Petersburg, 199004, Russia ' The Boston Consulting Group, 79 Robinson Road, 068897, Singapore
Abstract: This article seeks to contribute to the literature on corporate governance with particular focus on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We put our analysis into the context of Russian SOEs operating in an economy with a high level of the state presence, and investigate the relationship between board characteristics and the dividend policy of SOEs. Specifically, we add to the studies on corporate governance in emerging markets by consideration of professional attorneys, a special category of mandated directors and a unique feature of boards of Russian SOEs. We analysed a panel of 1,226 firm-year observations for 2009-2012, the specific period of incremental innovations in SOEs' governance. Generally, our results support the agency theory and demonstrate that an increase in the proportion of independent directors and professional attorneys and an increase in the dividend payouts occur simultaneously, while the proportion of executives on the board is negatively related to the payout ratio.
Keywords: board of directors; dividend policy; corporate governance; state-owned enterprises; emerging markets; Russia.
DOI: 10.1504/IJBGE.2023.129429
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 2023 Vol.17 No.2, pp.196 - 222
Received: 29 Nov 2020
Accepted: 23 Aug 2021
Published online: 09 Mar 2023 *