Authors: Yertai Tanai; Emmanuel Dechenaux
Addresses: Department of Information Systems and Decision Sciences, California State University, Fresno, Fresno, CA 93740, USA ' Department of Economics, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242, USA
Abstract: This paper examines a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party reverse logistics provider (3PRLP). We focus on the management of consumer product returns assuming deterministic demand and rate of returns. We consider coordination between the retailer and 3PRLP over the quantity of returns processed for resale. The retailer and the 3PRLP share the gains from coordination according to Nash bargaining, with threat points that depend on the wholesale and retail prices. The relationship between product returns and manufacturer price and profit depends on the feasibility of coordination, which depends on the rate of returns. For a range of rates, manufacturer profit is less under coordination than in the uncoordinated case despite coordination yielding overall efficiency gains. In this case, the manufacturer is unable to capture gains from downstream coordination. We discuss managerial implications for the manufacturer of considering downstream coordination and bargaining over product returns.
Keywords: closed-loop supply chain; 3PRLPs; supply chain coordination; consumer returns; Nash bargaining.
International Journal of Business Performance and Supply Chain Modelling, 2021 Vol.12 No.3, pp.204 - 232
Received: 19 May 2020
Accepted: 09 Jan 2021
Published online: 04 Oct 2021 *