Authors: Huining Wang; Xiuli Xu; Shuo Wang
Addresses: School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, 066004, China ' School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, 066004, China ' School of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, 066004, China
Abstract: In this paper, we research the customers' equilibrium behaviour in the single server Markovian queue with setup times and working vacation. In such an M/M/1 queueing system, the arriving customers' decision is whether to enter the system or balk based on the reward-cost structure, which includes their desire for service and their unwillingness to wait. We separately discuss the fully observable and fully unobservable cases. For each of case, we acquire the related equilibrium balking strategies of customers and the expected social benefits per time unit. Finally, we obtain some numerical examples to illustrate the effect of several parameters on the equilibrium and optimal strategy.
Keywords: M/M/1 queue; equilibrium strategies; setup times; working vacations; social benefits.
International Journal of Computing Science and Mathematics, 2019 Vol.10 No.5, pp.443 - 458
Available online: 21 Nov 2019 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article