Title: An auction mechanism for cloud resource allocation with time-discounting values

Authors: Yonglong Zhang; Bin Li; Mingfen Li; Jin Wang

Addresses: School of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University, Huayangxi Rd. 196, Yangzhou, China ' School of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University, Huayangxi Rd. 196, Yangzhou, China ' School of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University, Huayangxi Rd. 196, Yangzhou, China ' School of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University, Huayangxi Rd. 196, Yangzhou, China

Abstract: Group-buying has emerged as a new trading paradigm and became more attractive. Through it, both sides of the transaction will benefit from the group-buying: buyers enjoy a lower price and sellers receive more demanding orders. In this paper, we investigate an auction mechanism for cloud resource allocation with time discounting values via group-buying, called TDVG. TDVG consists of two steps: winning seller and buyer selection and pricing. In first step, we choose winning seller and buyer in a greedy manner according to some criterion, and calculate the payment for each winning seller and buyer in second step. Rigorous proof demonstrates that TDVG satisfies the properties of truthfulness, budget balance and individual rationality. Our experiment results show that TDVG achieves better total utility, matching rate and commodities utilisation than the existing works.

Keywords: cloud resource allocation; auction; time discounting values; group-buying.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCSE.2019.103244

International Journal of Computational Science and Engineering, 2019 Vol.20 No.1, pp.7 - 14

Received: 17 Dec 2016
Accepted: 12 Apr 2017
Published online: 23 Oct 2019 *

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