Title: Non-malleable encryption with proofs of plaintext knowledge and applications to voting

Authors: Ben Smyth; Yoshikazu Hanatani

Addresses: Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg ' Toshiba Corporation, Kawasaki, Japan

Abstract: Non-malleable asymmetric encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge are sufficient for secrecy in some domains. For example, ballot secrecy in voting. In these domains, some applications derive encryption schemes by coupling malleable ciphertexts with proofs of plaintext knowledge, without evidence that the sufficient condition (for secrecy) is satisfied nor an independent security proof (of secrecy). Consequently, it is unknown whether these applications satisfy desirable secrecy properties. In this article, we propose a generic construction for such a coupling and show that our construction produces non-malleable encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge. Furthermore, we show how our results can be used to prove ballot secrecy of voting systems. Accordingly, we facilitate the development of applications satisfying their security objectives.

Keywords: asymmetric encryption; ballot secrecy; homomorphic encryption; indistinguishability; non-malleability; privacy; secrecy; voting.

DOI: 10.1504/IJSN.2019.103150

International Journal of Security and Networks, 2019 Vol.14 No.4, pp.191 - 204

Received: 14 Jan 2019
Accepted: 07 Feb 2019
Published online: 21 Oct 2019 *

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