Title: An evolutionary game theory model for emergency supply allocation in disaster relief

Authors: Liang Zhao; Junmei Li

Addresses: Systemic Research Department, Systems Engineering Institute, The Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Beijing, China ' Systemic Research Department, Systems Engineering Institute, The Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Beijing, China

Abstract: In the face of increasingly frequent emergencies such as natural disasters and public health crises, the efficiency and fairness of emergency supply allocation has become a critical concern. This paper proposes an evolutionary game model involving three key stakeholders - the government, relief workers and disaster victims - to analyse their strategic behaviours in emergency supply distribution. Under bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the model constructs a tripartite evolutionary game framework, derives replicator dynamic equations and identifies evolutionarily stable strategies for each party. Results show that emergency stockpiles, transportation efficiency and surplus levels significantly influence strategic choices. In particular, the shift to innovative disaster relief becomes stable when its capacity exceeds the combined capacity and surplus of the traditional model. Simulations further confirm that optimised reserves and cooperative distribution enhance system stability and promote rational responses from victims.

Keywords: emergency material deployment; evolutionary game; strategy selection; evolutionary stabilisation strategy.

DOI: 10.1504/IJWMC.2026.155327

International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing, 2026 Vol.31 No.1, pp.30 - 41

Received: 27 Feb 2025
Accepted: 19 Jul 2025
Published online: 30 Jul 2026 *

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