Cryptanalysis of certificateless authenticated key agreement protocols
by Runzhi Zeng; Libin Wang
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing (IJAHUC), Vol. 34, No. 4, 2020

Abstract: In this work, we cryptanalyse two certificateless authenticated key agreement (CL-AKA) protocols, Bala et al. (2018) and Xie et al. (2019), which are recently proposed claiming provable security. Specifically, we show impersonation attacks against the two protocols with successful probability 1 in extended eCK model using at most two queries. Then, the process of our cryptanalysis is abstracted to a general method for cryptanalysing a specific class of CL-AKA protocols which we call linearly-expressible CL-AKA protocol. Our method suggests new security requirements of CL-AKA protocols.

Online publication date: Mon, 20-Jul-2020

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