Threshold of preference for collusion and interconnection fees in different market structures: the Tunisian mobile market case Online publication date: Thu, 31-May-2018
by Sami Debbichi; Walid Hichri
International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise (IJCENT), Vol. 6, No. 1, 2018
Abstract: With imperfect competition in the mobile phone market, the regulator cannot easily control the behaviour of the operators. In this paper, we develop an indicator "critical threshold preference for collusion" (C.T. P.C) in Duopoly and Oligopoly market. Our goal is to compare this indicator where actors are private, mixed or public. Using Cournot model, we assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection fees; only information available to the regulator. We estimate the different threshold values calculated in each Market structure with variables related to the Tunisian market structures and prices. The Econometric estimation of the different threshold values is consistent with our theoretical results. Our findings suggest how to control collusion by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each market structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalisation policies.
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