Title: Incentive for information sharing through revenue-sharing contracts in a logistics service provider and customer relationship

Authors: Ralf Elbert; Cora Tränkner; Özhan Özsucu; Michael Gleser

Addresses: Chair of Management and Logistics, Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology), Hochschulstraße 1, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany ' Chair of Management and Logistics, Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology), Hochschulstraße 1, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany ' Chair of Management and Logistics, Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology), Hochschulstraße 1, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany ' Chair of Management and Logistics, Department of Law and Economics, Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology), Hochschulstraße 1, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany

Abstract: The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of revenue-sharing contracts in the setting of a logistics buyer-supplier relationship on the willingness to share information between the actors involved. As interests of the actors are aligned when using a revenue-sharing contract, the willingness for information sharing is expected to increase. This increase will lead to improvement of overall performance within the relationship. To measure the impact of the revenue-sharing contract on willingness for information sharing, a laboratory experiment is conducted. Basis of this experiment is a modified investment game, allowing for information sharing possibilities. The use of an experimental setup allows for a controlled environment and reproducibility when analysing the behaviour of the actors involved. To evaluate the data obtained from our laboratory experiment, non-parametric statistics are applied. The results of the experiment indicate a significant change in the subjects' behaviour when a revenue-sharing contract is in place. Results show an increase in willingness to share information when a revenue-sharing contract is introduced as well as increased overall profits. The results of the experiment indicate that revenue-sharing contracts have the potential to evoke the willingness for information sharing.

Keywords: laboratory behavioural experiments; logistics service providers; logistics relationships; revenue-sharing contract; investment game; services; trust; reciprocity; information sharing.

DOI: 10.1504/IJISM.2018.095700

International Journal of Integrated Supply Management, 2018 Vol.12 No.1/2, pp.143 - 165

Accepted: 30 Jun 2018
Published online: 16 Oct 2018 *

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