Authors: Guangquan Zhou; Xiaoping Wu
Addresses: Key Laboratory of Engineering Structure of Heavy Railway, Ministry of Education, Central South University, Hunan Changsha 410004, China ' Key Laboratory of Engineering Structure of Heavy Railway, Ministry of Education, Central South University, Hunan Changsha 410004, China; Centre for Transport Studies, University of London, London, WC1E 6BT, UK
Abstract: In this study, we set asymmetric logical frames to simulate the collaborative process, and assume that the two given environmental factors are players. Given the equal strength of the players in the natural state, it is clear that the classical hawk-dove game model does not consider the strength of both sides. Hence, we continue to develop models based on the classical model, considering the effects of asymmetric interaction. Similarly, in model analysis, we introduce value engineering theory to simplify the model. The suitability of the model design is verified through computer simulations. Simulation graphics show that the probability of cooperation between two sides increases with the difference in strength between the two sides. In addition, the lower the unit value of conflict, the higher is the probability of cooperation. In this strategic direction, we can avoid the application and disoriented development of a wide variety of technology strategies.
Keywords: green railway alignment selection; asymmetry evolution; hawk-dove game model; cooperation.
International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences, 2017 Vol.10 No.4, pp.315 - 326
Available online: 05 Sep 2017 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article