Authors: C. Richard Baker
Addresses: Adelphi University, 1 South Avenue, Garden City, NY 11530, USA
Abstract: We suggest that a type of charade has developed in the tax-exempt leasing arena, one in which lessor/investors are confident of the enforceability of leases with governmental units, while simultaneously governmental officials and citizens are convinced that tax-exempt leases can be cancelled, and therefore do not constitute |debt| under state laws. We examine this charade using an aspect of institutional theory, one which suggests that ambiguous laws may be interpreted as malleable political resources that can be used to serve interests that go against public policy.
Keywords: accountability; governmental accounting; public policy; tax-exempt leasing; transparency; United States; USA; debt.
International Journal of Public Policy, 2005 Vol.1 No.1/2, pp.148 - 161
Available online: 19 Sep 2005 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article