Title: A discrimination matching model for academic recruitment
Authors: Luigi Bonaventura
Addresses: Department of Economics and Business, University of Catania, C.so Italia, 55, 95125, Catania, Italy
Abstract: In a matching model of the academic labour market, with outside and inside workers, this paper shows that outsiders are harmed by the insiders. This is due on two types of search frictions: information and cooptation. Each frictions reduce the probability to get an academic job for outsiders compared to insiders. A high level of cooptation discards the outsiders but, under certain conditions, the absence of cooptation does not decrease the possibility to get an academic job for insiders. Within this framework, some explanations about the low probability to retain the best, and the obstacles for an effective equal opportunity between insider and outsider candidates are discussed.
Keywords: academic labour market; search frictions; information; cooptation; recruitment systems; academic recruitment; discrimination; matching models; pluralism; meritocracy; outsiders; insiders; academic jobs; higher education; equal opportunities; insider candidates; outsider candidates.
DOI: 10.1504/IJPEE.2014.063508
International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, 2014 Vol.5 No.2, pp.133 - 143
Published online: 26 Jul 2014 *
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