Title: Monitoring board committee structure and market valuation in large publicly listed South African corporations

Authors: Collins G. Ntim

Addresses: Centre for Accounting, Accountability and Governance, School of Management, University of Southampton, Building 2, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK; Department of Accountancy, University Huddersfield Business School, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK

Abstract: We examine the association between the presence of monitoring board committees (i.e., audit, nomination, and remuneration) and market valuation in South Africa using a sample of listed corporations. We find a significant positive connection between the presence of monitoring board committees and market valuation, but only in corporations that have independent monitoring board committees and/or all three monitoring board committees that we have investigated simultaneously. This implies that the market values corporations with independent and/or the three monitoring board committees more highly. Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which indicates that the presence of independent board committees increases the capacity of corporate boards to effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation.

Keywords: corporate governance; monitoring board committees; market valuation; endogeneity; South Africa; publicly listed companies; agency theory; independent board committees.

DOI: 10.1504/IJMFA.2013.058552

International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 2013 Vol.5 No.3, pp.310 - 325

Published online: 21 Oct 2014 *

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