Authors: Gary Madden; Erik Bohlin; Aaron Morey
Addresses: Department of Econometrics and Quantitative Modelling, Curtin University, Kent Street, Bentley, WA 6102, Australia ' Department of Technology Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, SE-412 96, Gothenburg, Sweden ' Communication Economics and Electronic Markets Research Centre, Kent Street, Bentley, WA 6102, Australia
Abstract: National regulatory authorities (NRAs) attempt to encourage participation in spectrum assignments by enhancing entrants' likelihood of success. The question this study addresses is: can NRA policy tools really affect the probability an entrant wins a 3G spectrum licence? In particular, the econometric analysis allows consideration of whether licence concession or mode of assignment encourages entry. The study finds that auction assignment processes only slightly increase the probability of entry, whilst price and quantity concessions have no impact.
Keywords: market entry; global markets; mobile phones; cell phones; 3G spectrum assignment; network economics; 3G mobile telecommunications; mobile communications; 3G licences; auction assignment; price concessions; quantity concessions.
International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2012 Vol.2 No.4, pp.374 - 391
Available online: 01 Feb 2013 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article