Authors: Edmond Baranes
Addresses: University of Montpellier I, Rue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2, France
Abstract: This paper deals with competition in communications markets between an incumbent and a competitor. We analyse the effect of bundling strategy by a firm that enters an incumbent market. This market dimension has deep implications on the sustainability of collusion. In an infinitely repeated game framework, we show that the bundling strategy of the entrant might hinder collusion. Furthermore, we consider a setting in which the competitor uses a one-way access that the incumbent possesses. In such a situation, we show that when the competitor bundles its products, a low access charge might increase the feasibility of collusion. This result has an important policy implication.
Keywords: networks; bundling; access charge; unbundling local loop; collusion; telecommunications; competition; regulation; differentiation; communications markets; management.
International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2009 Vol.1 No.4, pp.357 - 377
Published online: 25 Apr 2010 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article