Title: Union-firm bargaining, managerial delegation and corporate mergers
Authors: Chao-Tung Wong, Chia-Yon Chen, Leonard F.S. Wang
Addresses: Department of Resource Engineering, National Cheng Kung University, No.1, University Road, Tainan City 701, Taiwan, ROC. ' Department of Resource Engineering, National Cheng Kung University, No.1, University Road, Tainan City 701, Taiwan, ROC. ' Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung, No.700, Kaohsiung University Road, Nan-Tzu District 811, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, ROC
Abstract: This article examines how different organisations of union affect the incentives for mergers in a duopoly model with managerial incentives. It is found that when workers are organised in independent unions, the increase in firms| bargaining power will create incentives for the firms to merge; nevertheless, when workers are organised in a single union, whether the firms merge or not, the unions will get the same rents and the firms will have the same profits. Managerial implication and case illustrations were provided by using the cases of China Steel Corporation (CSC) and China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) in Taiwan as the examples to support the model in both theoretical illustrations and managerial strategies.
Keywords: corporate mergers; enterprise development; managerial delegation; wage bargaining; trade unions; independent unions; China Steel Corporation; CSC; China Shipbuilding Corporation; CSBC; Taiwan; merger incentives.
International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development, 2009 Vol.7 No.4, pp.373 - 381
Published online: 06 Jun 2009 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article