Title: The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Authors: Jean-Philippe Bonardi, Santiago Urbiztondo, Bertrand V. Quelin

Addresses: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Dorigny 1015, Switzerland. ' Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), Av. Cordoba 637, 4 P., Buenos Aires (CP 1054), Argentina. ' HEC Paris, Member of the CNRS Research Group GREGHEC (UMR #2959), 1, rue de la Liberation – 78351, Jouy en Josas Cedex, France

Abstract: To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Keywords: regulatory convergence; telecommunications; unbundling regulations; political economy; public utilities; public utility regulation; regulation impacts; local impact.

DOI: 10.1504/IJMNE.2009.024786

International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2009 Vol.1 No.2, pp.232 - 256

Published online: 30 Apr 2009 *

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