Title: A comparative investigation to determine whether or not to maintain strategic inventory for a two-period green supply chain model using the game theory approach

Authors: Animesh Mondal; Ranjan Kumar Jana; Dipak Kumar Jana

Addresses: Department of Mathematics and Humanities, Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology, Surat‑395007, Gujarat, India ' Department of Mathematics and Humanities, Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology, Surat‑395007, Gujarat, India ' School of Applied Science and Humanities, Haldia Institute of Technology, Haldia, Purba Midnapur-721657, West Bengal, India

Abstract: In this research paper, we have developed a green supply chain (GSC), a novel model with a retailer and a manufacturer where the manufacturer produces green products and sells them to the customers by offering quantity discounts via the retailer. Based on four-game structures, viz., manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS), Nash and cost-sharing (CS), we have explored the comparative analysis to determine whether to maintain strategic inventory or not to maintain strategic inventory for a given two-period GSC. The analysis outcome may be beneficial to decide which power strategy supply chain players will adopt and maintain strategic inventory for better profit. A total of eight analytical models have been derived and explored. The novel demand function depends on the retail price, green level and quantity discount. At last, numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are provided to understand the better model comparison. The optimal results are computed in terms of closed-form solutions and displayed graphically. This study indicates that the preference is highly responsive to the game structure.

Keywords: green supply chain; GSC; game theory; quantity discount; strategic inventory; cost sharing.

DOI: 10.1504/IJADS.2024.139408

International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences, 2024 Vol.17 No.4, pp.434 - 465

Received: 27 Oct 2022
Accepted: 08 Mar 2023
Published online: 02 Jul 2024 *

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