Title: A two-echelon supply chain contract under advertisement and retail price-dependent demand

Authors: Rubi Das; Abhijit Barman; Pijus Kanti De

Addresses: Department of Mathematics, National Institute of Technology Silchar, Silchar, Assam, 788010, India ' Department of Mathematics, National Institute of Technology Silchar, Silchar, Assam, 788010, India ' Department of Mathematics, National Institute of Technology Silchar, Silchar, Assam, 788010, India

Abstract: In this study, we have considered the coordination issues of a supply chain system composed of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier offers a single product to the retailer, and the customer demand for the product at the retailer's end is advertisement and retail price dependent. We have investigated the behaviour of the two-layered supply chain under the integrated and non-integrated scenario. Both models' nature provides significant perceptions to an organisation's manager to achieve optimum strategy under price and advertisement dependent demand. The main objective is to maximise the supply chain's overall profit by optimising selling price, wholesale price, order quantity, and replenishment time. We have established the decentralised structure under the Stackelberg game approach to find the optimal values of each channel member. A numerical example and study of sensitivity analysis are provided to validate our proposed model.

Keywords: inventory? advertisement? price? supply chain? centralised? decentralised? Stackelberg game.

DOI: 10.1504/IJMOR.2022.121117

International Journal of Mathematics in Operational Research, 2022 Vol.21 No.2, pp.232 - 253

Received: 07 Oct 2020
Accepted: 04 Jan 2021

Published online: 25 Feb 2022 *

Full-text access for editors Full-text access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article