Title: Multiple directorships and managerial ability

Authors: Ameneh Bazrafshan; Reza Hesarzadeh

Addresses: Imam Reza International University, Felestin Square, Mashhad 91735553, Iran ' Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Azadi Square, Mashhad 9177948974, Iran

Abstract: Theoretical literature provides different predictions on the relationship between multiple directorships and managerial ability (relationship). Therefore, we empirically investigate the relationship. We find that the relationship is generally negative and statistically significant but not economically significant, i.e., the relationship is very small. In this regard, we show that the relationship is negative (positive) and also statistically and economically significant for firms with high levels of monitoring (advising) needs. Furthermore, we show that the regulatory oversight (1) mitigates the general negative relationship; (2) changes the direction of relationship from negative to positive, for firms with high levels of monitoring needs; and (3) does not influence the relationship, for firms with high levels of advising needs. Collectively, the results suggest that the monitoring-advising needs and regulatory oversight are important factors in the analysis of the relationship.

Keywords: directorships; management; managerial ability; corporate performance; monitoring needs; advising needs; regulatory oversight; agency theory; corporate governance; busyness hypothesis; capital market.

DOI: 10.1504/EJIM.2021.111898

European Journal of International Management, 2021 Vol.15 No.1, pp.146 - 168

Received: 17 Apr 2018
Accepted: 01 Aug 2018

Published online: 21 Dec 2020 *

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