Title: Entrenchment, director' networks, and CEO compensation

Authors: Najla Hamdi; Mohamed Imen Gallali

Addresses: Dr. Department of Finance, Tunisia High Business School, Manouba University, Tunisia ' Pr. Department of Finance, Tunisia High Business School, Manouba University, Tunisia

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and the hypothesis of entrenchment according to the two approaches of governance (disciplinary and cognitive); a model is developed and tested. Based on a sample of 130 Canadian companies, composing the Toronto stock index S&P /TSX cover the period from 2005 to 2015, we examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Our results suggest that in Canada the executive's network (centrality degree), in our case, enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation.

Keywords: executive remuneration; professional and social networks; corporate governance; entrenchment of executive.

DOI: 10.1504/IJESB.2020.104239

International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, 2020 Vol.39 No.1/2, pp.2 - 26

Received: 15 Sep 2017
Accepted: 30 Jan 2018
Published online: 23 Dec 2019 *

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