Title: Network neutrality and foreclosing market exchange

 

Author: T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky, Lawrence J. Spiwak

 

Addresses:
Department of Political Science, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36830, USA.
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, 5335 Wisconsin Ave – Ste. 440, Washington, DC 20015, USA.
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, 5335 Wisconsin Ave – Ste. 440, Washington, DC 20015, USA.
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, 5335 Wisconsin Ave – Ste. 440, Washington, DC 20015, USA

 

Journal: Int. J. of Management and Network Economics, 2009 Vol.1, No.2, pp.160 - 175

 

Abstract: We analyse the effects of 'network neutrality' proposals that seek to foreclose or severely limit market transactions. Our model reveals that rules that prohibit efficient commercial transactions between content and broadband service providers could be bad for all participants – consumers would pay higher prices, the profits of the broadband service provider would decline, and the sales of internet content providers would also decline. Moreover by shifting costs to consumers that are more efficiently borne in the exchange between content and broadband providers, such rules may shift sales from content providers to the broadband provider's content affiliate.

 

Keywords: network neutrality; regulation; internet content; broadband providers; market transactions; foreclosure; transaction limits; commercial transactions; content providers.

 

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJMNE.2009.024782

 

 

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