On the algebraic attack against summation type keystream generators Online publication date: Sat, 30-Aug-2014
by Md. Iftekhar Salam; Hoon-Jae Lee
International Journal of Information and Computer Security (IJICS), Vol. 5, No. 2, 2012
Abstract: The recently proposed algebraic attack has been proved to be very powerful against certain type of structure dependent cryptographic schemes especially LFSR-based stream ciphers. In this paper, we have investigated the algebraic attack against summation type of keystream generators. We have analysed the algebraic attack for three particular summation type generators: Rueppel's summation generator, LM generator and PingPong keystream generator. The efficiency of the algebraic attack against these generators are compared in terms of time, data and memory complexity. It will be shown that the, Rueppel's summation generator and the LM generator can be broken down with much less complexity compare to the exhaustive key search. However, for the case of PingPong stream cipher, we have found that it is infeasible to recover the secret key based on algebraic attack, mainly due to the irregular clock controlling function employed in the PingPong keystream generator.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Information and Computer Security (IJICS):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook