Of acting principals and principal agents: goal incongruence in the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship Online publication date: Sun, 08-Feb-2009
by Esben Christensen, Robert Wuebker, Rolf Wustenhagen
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business (IJESB), Vol. 7, No. 3, 2009
Abstract: This qualitative study examines the motivations for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to act opportunistically toward one another. Structured interviews with 14 employees and five investors in a VC-funded startup revealed that venture capitalists expect opportunistic behaviour from entrepreneurs during investment rounds, but largely trust entrepreneurs between financing rounds. Both the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs reported that venture capitalists act opportunistically towards the entrepreneur and other venture partners during all stages of the startup development. These findings have important implications for entrepreneurship research, most notably, the applicability of agency theory as a theoretical perspective from which to view the complex relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Online publication date: Sun, 08-Feb-2009
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