Authors: Rihab Guidara; Younes Boujelbene
Addresses: URECA, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Sfax, Airport Road Km 4, Sfax 3018, Tunisia ' URECA, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Sfax, Airport Road Km 4, Sfax 3018, Tunisia
Abstract: The choice of disclosure mechanisms allows managers more discretion in controlling the type, the extent and the timing of disclosure. The R&D setting extends the scope of managerial discretion, since there are strong acceleration of innovation, high rate of R&D and a controversial accounting treatment of R&D debate which increase the need of investors to this information. This paper examines the strategy of communication on R&D activities after IFRS adoption. It attempts to know what makes firms disclose voluntary information about R&D activities. The study concerns all French R&D intensive companies for 5-year period from 2007 to 2011. It uses financial data from the Worldscope database and the information disclosed in annual reports. Results show that firm size, leverage, R&D intensity, and auditors' quality have a strong positive impact on R&D disclosure. These findings point out that R&D information disclosure is related to information asymmetry between investors and managers.
Keywords: determinants; information asymmetry; information disclosure; R&D disclosure; voluntary disclosure; research and development; France; innovation; accounting; IFRS adoption; International Financial Reporting Standards; firm size; leverage; R&D intensity; auditor; quality.
International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting, 2016 Vol.8 No.3/4, pp.270 - 295
Available online: 25 Jan 2017 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article