Authors: Junnosuke Shino
Addresses: Bank of Japan, 2-1-1 Nihonbashi-Hongokucho, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-8660, Japan
Abstract: We construct a global-game LLR model in which the policy maker to provide LLR is an explicit player that cannot distinguish solvent from insolvent banks ex ante. We first show that creditors' aggregate behaviour to withdraw their funds operates as a signal to the policy maker about banks' solvency. Then it is shown that the policy maker optimally helps only illiquid but solvent banks and the lending rates are strictly positive whenever LLR is utilised. The rates can be seen as 'conditionally punitive' in the sense that they take the highest level under the restriction that the solvent borrowers survive.
Keywords: LLR; lender of last resort; global games; Bagehot Doctrine; penalty rate lending; game analysis; creditor behaviour; fund withdrawals; bank solvency; lending rates; solvent banks; insolvent banks; banking industry.
International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 2015 Vol.8 No.4, pp.398 - 421
Available online: 27 Nov 2015 *Full-text access for editors Access for subscribers Purchase this article Comment on this article