Authors: Stefan Behringer
Addresses: Universität Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, Juridicum Raum 0.65, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Abstract: This paper looks at competition in the telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network-based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level and thus reconcile theory with regulatory practice.
Keywords: asymmetric networks; telecommunications industry; competition policy; access pricing; regulation; non-cooperative pricing; nonlinear tariffs; price discrimination; regulatory practice.
International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 2012 Vol.2 No.3, pp.257 - 281
Received: 08 May 2021
Accepted: 12 May 2021
Published online: 11 Aug 2012 *