Social contract and democratic validity of constitution (with a focus on Iran and Iraq) Online publication date: Mon, 25-Feb-2019
by Sabah Mofidi
International Journal of Human Rights and Constitutional Studies (IJHRCS), Vol. 6, No. 3, 2019
Abstract: This article tries to study the validity of constitutions based on the social contract theory. In this relation, the main outlined question is that is it valid and should the people follow this general and basic law at a country or territory when it is not based on a real social contract and a social group abuses it against others? For answering the question, at first, the constitution as a social contract and a characteristic of modern state and its democratic validity based on social contract are discussed. At the second stage, two sample constitutions of Iran and Iraq are examined and evaluated. As a result, it concludes that a constitution is to be adhered to until it has democratic validity, shows the rights of all people and is enforced completely. Accordingly, the two sample constitutions are not based on a real social contract and have no democratic validity. There are some problems in both their content and implementation.
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