Agency conflicts between business owners and managers: empirical evidence from Tunisia Online publication date: Tue, 04-Dec-2018
by Mariem Amamou; Kais Ben-Ahmed
International Journal of Business Performance Management (IJBPM), Vol. 20, No. 1, 2019
Abstract: This paper proposes a solution to reduce agency conflicts which arise between managers and owners. We examine the relationship between managerial implication and firm performance. A structural model was applied to ten Tunisian banks covering the period 2000-2015 to test both managerial involvements on risk and performance. Results showed the relevant role of managers' implication in reducing conflicts of interest. Specifically, where managers are weakly involved, managerial implication creates more value for the shareholders. Furthermore, the relationship between firm performance and managerial implication depends on the level of risk-taking by the managers and approaches zero at a critical bank risk equal to 20.55%. Similarly, the relationship between risk and share of managers vanishes at a critical performance point equal to 42.70%. Overall, our findings call for implementing performance management system to help banks better manages their employee's performance and in turn, reduces conflicts between managers and owners.
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