Choices under epistemic pluralism in economics Online publication date: Tue, 27-Nov-2018
by Imko Meyenburg
International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education (IJPEE), Vol. 9, No. 4, 2018
Abstract: At the core of the pluralist argument in economics is the rejection of the logical positivists' reductionist 'one size fits all' approach to scientific research. Instead, pluralists argue that there are multiple ways of constructing knowledge and that we cannot decide on the one best methodology or epistemic principle; in short, pluralistic knowledge is all there is. Yet, epistemic pluralism implies the absence of a single conclusive final methodology or epistemological principle, and consequently choice of methods, theories and concepts risk becoming relativistic under pluralism. In the light of the absence of objective choice criteria this paper argues: 1) that choices can be justified through consensuses in intellectual exchanges; 2) that MacIntyrian epistemological crises are a suitable basis for consensus under pluralism; 3) choice under pluralism, understood as migration between different frameworks, becomes necessary for the development of framework-dependent narratives and resulting policy implications.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education (IJPEE):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook