A game theory-based design of incentive schemes for social cloud services
by Eric Kuada
International Journal of Cloud Computing (IJCC), Vol. 7, No. 2, 2018

Abstract: This paper presents the design of incentive schemes that encourage the contribution of resources to the opportunistic cloud services (OCS) social cloud platform as well as the efficient usage of such resources. A game theoretic approach has been employed to model and design the incentive schemes with two game models presented. The existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both the cooperative and non-cooperative games has been proven. Three base incentive schemes have also been presented. These schemes are the dominant strategy scheme, equi-profit scheme, and dominant equi-profit scheme. Evaluation of the incentive schemes are performed and conclusion made that the schemes meet the desired properties of budget-balance, ex-post individual rationality, incentive compatibility, allocative efficiency, robustness, and flexibility to accommodate changing user behaviour on the OCS social cloud services platform.

Online publication date: Fri, 03-Aug-2018

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Cloud Computing (IJCC):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com