Evolutionary stability analysis of government supervision on recycling of e-wastes Online publication date: Mon, 25-Jun-2018
by Yuxiang Yang; Dan Wu; Zuqing Huang; Baoyou Zhang; Lijun Meng
International Journal of Services Operations and Informatics (IJSOI), Vol. 9, No. 2, 2018
Abstract: Facing an increasing number of e-wastes, we should take effective and efficient measure to recycle and dispose them. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary game model between the government and the manufacturers. We analyse the two groups' stability conditions and their behaviours. Moreover, we study the effect of some parameters on their stability. Results show that whether manufacturers recycle e-wastes or not is closely related to recycling cost, profit of recycling, and governmental subsidies or penalties. Therefore, the government should provide subsidies to encourage manufacturers to recycle more e-wastes, and increase the punishment for those who have not recycled e-wastes. To promote local governments to perform their functions in terms of waste reduction, the penalties from superior departments should be increased, and it is feasible to introduce the third-party supervision mechanism to decrease the cost of government supervision.
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