Modelling coopetition in aircraft spare part supply chain: game-theoretic approach
by Mohita Gangwar Sharma; Kashi N. Singh
International Journal of Procurement Management (IJPM), Vol. 10, No. 2, 2017

Abstract: Owing to constant pressure on the bottom line, companies have been forced to adopt a new relationship called 'coopetition', which is a combination of both 'cooperation' and 'competition'. Functionally, in supply chain this concept has been understood in a dyadic relationship and network relationship. This study considers specifically a coopetitive arrangement between two or more airlines for spares supply. In coopetition, players forge different types of coalitions as they share resources. In this paper, we model the possible coalitions in the aircraft spares supply scenario and examine stable outcomes using the concept of core in cooperative game theory. Shapley value can be one way of utilising and sustaining the potential of this concept. The managerial implication includes this discipline forming the basis of contracting and negotiations.

Online publication date: Sun, 12-Mar-2017

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