Provably secure CL-KEM-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol
by Junhan Yang; Bo Su; Chaoping Guo; Wenlin Han; Yang Xiao
International Journal of Sensor Networks (IJSNET), Vol. 23, No. 2, 2017

Abstract: Traditional password-based authentication protocols are vulnerable to various password-related attacks, while public key cryptography (PKC) is expensive to manage certificates. Moreover, the traditional identity-based cryptography suffers to key escrow. To solve the above problems, we propose a password-based authentication and key exchange (AKE) protocol. The protocol is based on certificateless key encapsulation mechanism (CL-KEM) using the three-party setting. The security of this protocol is provable under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Security analysis shows that this protocol can achieve mutual authentication and forward security, and it can resist various password-related attacks.

Online publication date: Thu, 05-Jan-2017

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