Revisiting the declining price anomaly in wine auctions
by Ginette McManus; Rajneesh Sharma; Michael Alleruzzo
International Journal of Economics and Business Research (IJEBR), Vol. 12, No. 4, 2016

Abstract: This paper investigates the declining price anomaly in wine auctions. The anomaly refers to the observation that when identical lots of wine are sold sequentially in a single auction, prices are more likely to decrease with later lots. Using The Chicago Wine Company's auction data, we find no evidence of declining prices in sequential wine auctions. The results are robust and consistent across wine price ranges.

Online publication date: Thu, 29-Dec-2016

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