Global CO₂ emissions and unilateral action: policy implications of induced trade effects
by Christoph Bohringer, Alfred Voß, Thomas F. Rutherford
International Journal of Global Energy Issues (IJGEI), Vol. 11, No. 1/2/3/4, 1998

Abstract: Unilateral action to combat an international externality such as CO₂ emissions produces efficiency losses through spill-over effects of carbon emission constraints on international markets. Emissions by non-participating countries may be increased through the relocation of energy-intensive production or reductions in the international oil price (so-called carbon leakage). Grandfathered emission permit systems are considered as one unilateral mitigation strategy which could avoid carbon leakage and increase efficiency of global CO₂ reduction as compared to unilateral uniform CO₂ taxes. This paper summarises results from a multiregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model application [1] which show that the efficiency argument for the use of grandfathered permits depends crucially on the specification of international trade.

Online publication date: Thu, 24-Jul-2003

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