An empirical investigation of executive stock option granting in Malaysia
by Ahmad Ibn Ibrahimy; Rubi Ahmad
International Journal of Business Excellence (IJBEX), Vol. 10, No. 4, 2016

Abstract: Ownership structure is an imperative factor in determining firm objectives, increasing the shareholders' wealth and disciplining the executives. Our study looks into the effectiveness of yearly executive stock option (ESO) granting as a corporate governance mechanism designed to reduce agency problems, thereby increasing firm value. Using fixed effect panel data analysis, we found a significant positive relationship between ESO granting and firm value in the presence of concentrated ownership in Malaysia. This relationship is significant for the years next to the years of ESO granting occurrences while considering both market and accounting-based performance measurements. Additionally, based on firm-size, we also found a significant difference of ESO granting of Malaysian non-financial firms.

Online publication date: Mon, 26-Sep-2016

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Business Excellence (IJBEX):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com