Greening game analysis in supply chains under three decision-making structures Online publication date: Mon, 22-Aug-2016
by Lei Yang; Yunlei Wei
International Journal of Services Technology and Management (IJSTM), Vol. 22, No. 3/4/5, 2016
Abstract: This paper examines a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the two members put in efforts for 'greening' their operations. We consider three different decision-making structures and discuss the optimal decision model from each player's perspective. In model 1, the manufacturer invests in greening and sets the price for the product then the retailer invests in greening and sets the retail price. In model 2, manufacturer-Stackelberg games of greening and pricing are played in sequence. Model 3 outlines the Nash games of greening and pricing, in which the greening Nash game firstly played. Our analysis shows that the manufacturer's profit is the highest in model 1 where the manufacturer has the first mover advantage. However, the retailer's expected profit is the highest in model 3 where the retailer has a good share in the channel leadership. In all models, integrated channel profits are the highest under model 1.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Services Technology and Management (IJSTM):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook