Seat allocation and pricing in a duopoly in the airline industry
by Chandra Sen Mazumdar; Parthasarathy Ramachandran
International Journal of Revenue Management (IJRM), Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014

Abstract: In this paper, we study the simultaneous problem of seat inventory allocation and pricing in a duopoly market environment in the airline industry. The problem of setting the booking limits and prices when passengers overflow from one airline to the other in response to price is studied. Our analysis indicates that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is achieved when there are no price differences between the airlines.

Online publication date: Thu, 05-Feb-2015

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