English multi-attribute reverse auction model with the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values
by Xianke Zeng; Yuqiang Feng
International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences (IJADS), Vol. 7, No. 4, 2014

Abstract: We propose a new English multi-attribute reverse auction model with the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values under the procurement auction scenario. The existing multi-attribute auction models usually do not include the constraints on non-monetary attributes bidding values. Obviously, it is unreasonable because the auctioneer usually will have a requirement for the non-monetary attribute value. So we extend the multi-attribute reverse auction model and propose the structurised mathematical expressions of the optimal bidding price and non-monetary attributes for the bidders' bidding decision. Further, we analyse the mathematical characteristics and the economic implications of these expressions. Finally, we present two numerical examples to demonstrate the minimum non-monetary attributes bidding values indeed impact on the bidders' bidding decision and the final auction result.

Online publication date: Mon, 27-Oct-2014

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