Transboundary emissions: are subsidies efficient? A game theoretical analysis of subsidizing environmental protection in Eastern Europe
by Franz Wirl
International Journal of Global Energy Issues (IJGEI), Vol. 6, No. 3/4/5, 1994

Abstract: This paper investigates how far selfish motives (due to transboundary pollution) support rod in the form of environmental protection in the former centrally planned economies, which are less concerned about environmental damage. It is shown that abatement investment in foreign countries crowds out domestic abatement activities (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium). This deters Western Europe's support in helping the economies in transition to clean up the environmental mess created by more than forty years' central planning.

Online publication date: Wed, 16-Jul-2014

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