The value of international cooperation: Optimising behaviour in climate change negotiations
by Clare Smith, Stephen Hall
International Journal of Global Energy Issues (IJGEI), Vol. 10, No. 2/3/4, 1998

Abstract: In this paper, an integrated model of the costs of climate change damage and carbon dioxide abatement is used under an optimal control regime to simulate the international agreements on greenhouse gas abatement, where each region aims to minimise their overall costs. The model used is EGEM (Environmental Global Econometric Model), described in Smith et al. [1], which forecasts energy related carbon dioxide emissions and the impact of carbon taxes. Here the model is extended to include a function for the costs of damage from climate change, and optimal policies are found under various scenarios by minimising both the long-run costs of damage and the cost of abatement in terms of the size of tax needed. Optimising from the perspectives of two non-cooperating regions (Europe and North America) is shown to produce significantly lower taxes than a cooperative case, resulting in large gains to cooperation.

Online publication date: Wed, 09-Jul-2014

The full text of this article is only available to individual subscribers or to users at subscribing institutions.

 
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.

Pay per view:
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.

Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Global Energy Issues (IJGEI):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:

Username:        Password:          Forgotten your password?

Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.

If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com