Auctions and retail price competition: a logit study of the North East
by Kevin A. Lawler, Kin Pui Lee, Chih Cheng Yang, Alfredo Moscardini
Global Business and Economics Review (GBER), Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model of Bertrand competition and uncertainty as to the number of rivals. The auction models predict retail price dispersion as an observable feature of retail price competition. The implication of the auction model are tested using a binary logit model on primary data. The findings show that consumer characteristics define type of store choice and that the auction model of price competition with uncertainty is an appropriate way to model retail store competition.

Online publication date: Mon, 07-Feb-2005

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