Termination and endgame scenarios in international joint ventures Online publication date: Mon, 07-Feb-2005
by Ursula F. Ott
Global Business and Economics Review (GBER), Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000
Abstract: The paper studies the applicability of game theory to the last period of an international joint venture life cycle. Since the past three decades were marked by the prosperity of multinational enterprises, IJVs are coming more and more in a mature stage. The termination of a cross-border business transaction causes, in general, various problems and needs mechanisms to solve. Besides legal considerations, issues of decision-making in endgame scenarios, such as the strategic settings of co-operation and control, play an important role. The special structure of the IJV-triangle might tell more about future ways of termination and the effect of co-operation and conflict. Not only the constellation of the players but also the duration of an IJV contract (short-term and long-term) has an impact on the behaviour of the players in the last stage of the life cycle. Using theoretical frameworks of game theory like common agency games and repeated games in combination offers a tool for dealing with special termination issues. ''Divorce scenarios'' capture problems of reputation, learning and renegotiation in which the repetition of certain actions leads to the end of the game.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the Global Business and Economics Review (GBER):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com