Auditor's choice and earning management after Enron scandals: empirical approach in French context Online publication date: Tue, 29-Apr-2014
by Jamel Azibi; Mohamed Tahar Rajhi
International Journal of Critical Accounting (IJCA), Vol. 5, No. 5, 2013
Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between ownership structures, auditor's choice and earning management after Enron scandals in the French context. The sample is composed of 119 firms from Thomason financial data bases and annual reports over 2002-2005 periods. Multivariate analyses document that: 1) property dispersion is associated with high audit quality even after Enron scandals; 2) whereas the banking confidence has been withdrawn after Enron failure; 3) finally, Big Four auditors have no effect on the magnitude of discretionary accruals.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Critical Accounting (IJCA):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com