Credit games of Taobao buyers and sellers Online publication date: Sat, 19-Jul-2014
by Yang Ying; Hong-Jian Qu
International Journal of Convergence Computing (IJCONVC), Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013
Abstract: The importance of e-commerce is increasingly visible, but the credit problem is still one of the bottlenecks of its development. This paper mainly researches the credit problems of Taobao (http://www.taobao.com) buyers and sellers based on the game theory. Firstly, the seller's credit problem is due to fraud, which leads to buyers' interests damage; secondly, the buyer's credit problem is due to Taobao's introduction of freight insurance, thus buyers can return goods very easily, which influences sellers obviously. Based on that, this paper builds the game model, which sets the strategies of buyers (purchase and return, purchase and not return, not purchase) and sellers (trust, not trust), and then draw the corresponding conclusions and recommendations through the analysis, which includes improving the technology costs (X) for seller to publish false information, increasing sellers' probability (q) of being discovered for fraud, and reducing the cost (A) of sellers' return rate.
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